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Abstract Philosophical discussions have critically ana-
lysed the methodological pitfalls and epistemological
implications of evidence assessment in medicine, however
they have mainly focused on evidence of treatment effi-
cacy. Most of this work is devoted to statistical methods of
causal inference with a special attention to the privileged
role assigned to randomized controlled trials (RCTs) in
evidence based medicine. Regardless of whether the RCT’s
privilege holds for efficacy assessment, it is nevertheless
important to make a distinction between causal inference of
intended and unintended effects, in that the unknowns at
stake are heterogonous in the two contexts. However,
although ‘‘lower level’’ evidence is increasingly acknowl-
edged to be a valid source of information contributory to
assessing the risk profile of medications on theoretical or
empirical grounds, current practices have difficulty in
assigning a precise epistemic status to this kind of evidence
because they are more or less implicitly parasitic on the
(statistical) methods developed to test drug efficacy. My
thesis is that (1) ‘‘lower level’’ evidence is justified on
distinct grounds and at different conditions depending on
the different epistemologies which one wishes to endorse,
in that each impose different constraints on the methods we
adopt to collect and evaluate evidence; (2) such constraints
ought to be understood to be different in the case of evi-
dence for risk versus benefit assessment for a series of
reasons which I will illustrate on the basis of the recent
debate on the causal association between acetaminophen
(a.k.a. paracetamol) and asthma.
Keywords Evidence hierarchies  Randomized
controlled trials  Clinical methodology  Causal
inference  Scientific inference  Induction 
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1 Introduction
Philosophers of science and practitioners have been
debating for years about the superiority of randomized
controlled trials (RCTs) over other forms of empirical
studies in order to assess the efficacy of treatments. This
debate has been made more dramatic by the diffusion and
acknowledgement of so called evidence hierarchies which
put RCTs at the top of evidence rankings.
Evidence hierarchies are intended as a decision heuris-
tics for professionals overwhelmed by data of heteroge-
neous quality and pressed by time constraints (Howick
et al. 2011). Nevertheless, they have been criticized for
uselessly (and mistakenly) censoring a considerable quan-
tity of potentially informative data, and at the same time for
failing to recognize the intrinsic limitations of RCTs
(Worral 2007a, b; Cartwright 2007). Regardless of whether
these considerations hold for efficacy assessment, it is
nevertheless important to make a distinction between
causal inference of intended (treatment efficacy) and
unintended effects (adverse reactions), in that the epistemic
framework is heterogeneous in the two contexts.
Indeed, both philosophers as well as epidemiologists and
health scientists have acknowledged the role of so called
‘‘lower level’’ evidence as a valid source of information
contributory to assessing the risk profile of medications
(Aronson and Hauben 2006; Howick et al. 2009;
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Vandenbroucke 2006). However, they have difficulty in
assigning a precise epistemic status to this kind of evidence
and in providing a coherent justification for the sorts of
exemptions they propose. In general, the quality of evi-
dence coming from other sources than RCTs is considered
high to the extent that possible known or unknown con-
founders can be safely excluded. Vandenbroucke (2008)
adds to this scheme the distinction between the context of
evaluation and the context of discovery as a possible
explanation for the asymmetry between evidence standards
for benefit versus risk assessment. On this basis he also
proposes to reverse evidence hierarchies when risks rather
than benefits of medical treatment are under scrutiny.
(Vandenbroucke 2008).
This is only part of the issue however; in that different
epistemological stances (hypothetico-deductive, inductive,
abductive) provide different rationales for justifying evi-
dence of diverse kinds and, because of this, may be more or
less adequate to the purpose of risk assessment. My thesis
is that, provided that knowledge about the drug risks comes
from different sources and grows cumulatively in the
course of time, inductive and abductive methods of causal
assessment are better suited to the purpose than deductive
ones. Furthermore, drug decisions are tied to the risk–
benefit balance: according to the precautionary principle,
the more severe is the new detected harm with respect to
the expected benefit, the lower can be the probability of
causal association between the harm and the suspected
drug, in order to allow for safety measures (Osimani 2007,
2013a, b; Osimani et al. 2011). Thus, not only the
hypothesis of causal connection need not be certain before
triggering preventive measures, but, on the contrary, these
measures must be enacted as soon as the hypothesis is
sufficiently strong with respect to the risk–benefit balance.
The conclusion is that the methodology for risk assessment
should be reconsidered in light of these epistemological
considerations and of their ethical implications.
The paper is structured as follows: Sect. 2 presents the
philosophical debate on evidence hierarchies and their
emphasis on randomized controlled trials (RCTs) as a
privileged form of evidence of treatment efficacy (benefit
assessment). Section 3 introduces Vandenbroucke’s pro-
posal to reverse evidence hierarchies when the evaluation
of harmful effects is at stake (as opposed to benefit eval-
uation). I will then introduce the distinction between
deductive and inductive/abductive approaches to scientific
inference and connect them to other proposals of amend-
ments to evidence hierarchies. Section 5 illustrates the
rationales behind each kind of proposal by displaying the
relationship between the underlying epistemologies and the
principle of total evidence. Section 6 brings my argumen-
tation to its conclusion by providing three distinctive rea-
sons for preferring inductive/abductive (‘‘vouchers’’) to
deductive methods (‘‘clinchers’’) of scientific inference
when dealing with causal assessment of harm. Section 7 is
devoted to the recent debate on the causal association
between acetaminophen and asthma as a case in point.
2 The Debate on RCTs as a Privileged Form
of Evidence in Medical Research
In evidence hierarchies for causal assessment RCTs are
preceded by meta-analysis, of RCTs, only and are regarded
as as the strongest evidence for therapeutic effectiveness,
surpassing any kind of observational study, not to mention
other sorts of evidence such as case reports (medical lit-
erature) or knowledge coming from basic science. More
specifically, randomized controlled studies are followed by
comparative studies which are not randomized (e.g. cohort
or case–control studies), and these are followed by rea-
soning about patophysiologic mechanisms underlying the
observed outcome. Expert judgment is regarded as the
weakest form of evidence and put at the bottom of the
hierarchy (see Howick 2011, for a recent philosophical
overview).
The rationale for this ranking is provided by methodo-
logical-foundational considerations mainly developed by
(frequentist) statisticians (but see Teira 2011, and Chalmers
2005, for a critical analysis of this issue). Within this
perspective, randomization is supposed to play two roles:
1) repeated randomization of the treatment among the
subjects in the sample, allows the study to approach in the
limit (in the long run) the true mean difference between
treated and untreated sample population (see Basu 1980,
and Teira 2011; 2) randomization allows to experimentally
isolate the cause under investigation from other prognostic
factors (confounders). To this aim, the experimental
machinery includes the following devices:
1. control (partition of the sample into treatment and
control group/s)
2. intervention (treatment administration by the experi-
menter), and
3. double-blinding and placebo (concealment of treat-
ment allocation from subjects and researchers).
Control allows for the comparison among treated and
non-treated groups, thus allowing to infer causal efficacy
by observing a difference in the two groups, provided that
they are balanced in terms of prognostic factors; inter-
vention severs the link between the treatment and the
(known and unknown) reasons which motivate its use in
real-life settings (self-selection bias); allocation conceal-
ment avoids allocation bias which might be caused by
conscious or unconscious experimenters’ expectations and
interests; furthermore it minimizes the influence of these
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factors on the performance of the trial in terms of patient
care and therapeutic support; and allocation concealment
from subjects allows to minimize the influence on the
experimental outcome caused by their expectations and
attitudes toward the treatment as well as by the related
behaviour. The specific role of randomization within this
picture is to guarantee the baseline balance of treatment
and control group(s) with reference to relevant prognostic
factors (alternative/additional causes of the outcome of
interest).
However, according to their critics, randomization is
neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure that the observed
experimental outcome can provide sound evidence about
the treatment effect. The toughest attack has been launched
by Howson and Urbach (2006) within a foundational
comparison of frequentist versus Bayesian methods of
statistical inference, and has been expanded on by John
Worral in a series of papers, which specifically address the
epistemic merits of RCTs (Worral 2007a, b, 2010). Wor-
ral’s critique can be summarized in the following eight
points:
1. Clinical researchers never randomize forever, so RTCs
do not reflect the ‘‘limiting average’’ of the means
differences between treatment and control group;
2. moreover there is ‘‘no sense in which we can ever
know how close a particular RCT is to yielding this
‘limiting average’’ (2007: 15);
3. Repeated randomization is, epistemically speaking,
impossible: ‘‘If a particular patient in the study
receives, say, the ‘active drug’ on the first round, then
since this is expected to have some effect on his or her
condition, the second randomization would not be
rigorously a repetition of the fist. The second trial
population, though consisting of the same individuals,
would, in a possibly epistemically significant sense,
not be the same population as took part in the initial
trial’’ (2007: 22):
4. allowing sufficient ‘‘wash out’’ times between the
rounds does not represent a perfect warrant against
‘‘contamination’’;
5. furthermore, repeated randomization is practically and
ethically unfeasible;
6. randomization is only a means to the end of balancing
the experimental groups and this aim can be reached
also through other tools such as deliberate matching
and ‘‘haphazard’’ allocation;
7. strictly speaking, it is not randomization but rather
masking treatment allocation, which wards off bias
due to experimenters’ and subjects’ interests and
expectations (allocation and self-selection bias);
8. some meta-analyses comparing the results of RCTs
and observational studies infer from the systematic
overestimation of effects in the latter that they are less
reliable; but judging the comparative reliability of
observational versus randomized studies by taking the
latter as the gold standard amounts to a petitio
principii.
Whereas points 1–5 represent indeed a formidable
objection to the application of frequentist statistics to
clinical trials, and point 8 needs no defence, still the role
of randomization in helping to ward off various forms of
bias cannot be entirely trivialized (points 6 and 7). A
pragmatic defence of RCTs, which nevertheless
acknowledges their methodological limitations can be
found in La Caze (2009) and Teira (2011). La Caze
emphasizes the distinctive roles played by intervention
and by randomization. While it is intervention that actu-
ally severs the causal link between the decision to take the
drug and all antecedents leading to this choice in real-life
context (i.e. all confounding related to self-selection bias);
randomization contributes nevertheless to the internal
validity of the experiment by increasing the chance that
comparison groups are balanced in terms of prognostic
factors. Quoting Suppes (1982) and Lindley (1982), La
Caze (2013) adds that randomization can also be defended
on Bayesian grounds as a way to simplify the computation
of the prior probability function concerning the belief
itself that relevant prognostic factors are indeed balanced
in the experimental groups.1
While La Caze provides reasons to privilege RCTs over
non-randomized studies in terms of reliability and com-
putational tractability, Teira (2011) analyzes the issue
within the perspective of strategic behaviour and regulatory
constraints (see also Teira and Reiss 2013). Teira
acknowledges the methodological limitations attributed to
RCTs by philosophers of science and in particular, he
points to the concrete possibility that randomization may
yield, just by chance, an unbalanced distribution of the
prognostic factors. However, he goes on, randomization ‘‘is
still a warrant that the allocation was not done on purpose
with a view to promoting somebody’s interests’’. Thus,
Teira explains the success of RCTs in regulatory protocols
for market approval of pharmaceutical products on grounds
that they guarantee impartiality. Randomization serves the
purpose to avoid that the uncertainty related to causal
inference be advantageously exploited by one party or the
other (I will come back to this point at the end of the
paper).
More cogently, the weakness of RCTs is evident when
considering the issue of external validity. This point has been
1 However, Suppes (1982) rather defends randomization as a way to
balance the two groups in causal inference, whereas he ascribes a
computational advantage to randomization within sample-to-popula-
tion inference.
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analytically treated by Cartwright (2007), who enumerates
the assumptions which should be met in order to export the
claim of efficacy from the sample to the target population.
These can be simplified in the requirement that at least one
causally homogeneous subgroup in the target population has
the same causal structure and probability measures of at least
one causally homogeneous subpopulation in the experimen-
tal sample. Thus the evidence provided even by an ideal (i.e.
perfectly internally valid) RCT can be extended to the target
population only with great caution. The conclusion is that not
only is randomization neither necessary nor sufficient to the
overall end of causal inference for medical treatments, but
that it is also not recommended for most practical purposes it
is supposed to pay service to, and that its interpretation and
use may need more information than it delivers (see also
Cartwright 2010).2
On the other hand, traditional advocates of RCTs and
evidence hierarchies are gradually recognizing that the
virtues of RCTs cannot secure their privileged position in
causal inference and efficacy assessment without any
further specifications. Thus they recommend that ran-
domization be not considered as the only criterion to
evaluate evidence quality: other characteristics such as
effect magnitude and consistency across studies, dose–
response gradient, as well as publication bias should be
taken into account as well. Also the problems of external
validity and extrapolation are regarded as particularly
serious for implementing results of RCTs on target pop-
ulations (see for instance Howick 2011). This awareness
has led to the development of new guidelines for ranking
evidence (e.g. the GRADE System: Guyatt et al. 2008,
2011; see also the 2011 Oxford CEBM Levels of Evi-
dence: Howick et al. 2011).
Now, this debate on RCTs and evidence hierarchies has
failed so far to clearly distinguish the context of efficacy
versus risk assessment and treated them as one and the same
problem. Undeniably, awareness of this distinction is grad-
ually growing, and ‘‘lower level’’ evidence is increasingly
acknowledged to be a valid source of information contrib-
utory to assessing the risk profile of medications on theo-
retical (Aronson and Hauben 2006; Howick et al. 2009) or
empirical grounds (Papanikolaou et al. 2006; Benson and
Hartz 2000; Golder et al. 2011; Concato et al. 2000). Indeed,
in their comparative analysis of RCTs and observational
studies, Papanikolaou et al. (2006) for instance assert that ‘‘it
may be unfair to invoke bias and confounding to discredit
observational studies as a source of evidence on harms’’ (p.
640, my emphasis). But nobody until now has explained
why this should be so. In my opinion there are two answers
to this question. One is related to substantive issues con-
cerning such problems as causal interaction, modularity and
external validity as well as extrapolation when evaluating
the reliability of experimental or observational methods; the
other relates to epistemic issues concerning the constraints
we put on evidence and to foundational issues in scientific
inference. I will address in this paper the latter dimension
and argue that:
1. different epistemologies may justify ‘‘lower level’’
evidence on different grounds;
2. in the case of risk detection and assessment non-
deductive epistemologies are better suited to the
purpose.
I will start my argument by presenting Vandenbroucke’s
proposal to reverse evidence hierarchies and consider his
argumentative points in light of the epistemological para-
digms they more or less implicitly are based on.
3 ‘‘Epistemic Asymmetry’’ of Risk Versus Efficacy
Assessment
In the last decade a series of papers written mainly by
epidemiologists has developed the view that evidence for
harm and for efficacy should be evaluated according to
different criteria (Vandenbroucke and Psaty 2008; Van-
denbroucke 2004, 2006, 2007, 2008; Psaty and Van-
denbroucke 2008; Papanikolaou et al. 2006; Stricker and
Psaty 2004; Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
2007). These studies underline the different value of ran-
domized controlled experiments and observational studies
(included case reports) for benefit and risk assessment.
Some have also proposed a reversal of the hierarchy for
risk detection with respect to benefit assessment (Van-
denbroucke 2008), and have advocated a sort of method-
ological pluralism according to which study designs are
evaluated in relation to the research goal and the incognita
under investigation. As a consequence, no epistemic
advantage of randomized versus observational studies is
claimed in principle, but rather their evidential strength is
evaluated with respect to whether they are used to evaluate
2 Papineau (1994) insists on the different roles played by random
sampling as a means to achieve sample representativeness (i.e.
external validity), and experimental randomization as a means to
avoid self-selection bias and to deal with unknown confounders in
causal inference (i.e. internal validity). He defends the latter, while
acknowledging the epistemic paradoxes affecting the former. It
should be however noted that patient recruitment is far from
complying with the principles of random sampling in a strict sense.
Furthermore, as also Urbach (1994) in his reply to Papinau
underlines: ‘‘population probabilities are, in my opinion, not easy to
conceptualize when we are dealing with the responses of types of
patient to medical interventions’’ (p. 714). Which is indeed the issue
analyzed in detail by Cartwright (2007). It is worth noting that, the
problem of external validity affects observational studies and studies
of mechanisms as well (Howick et al. 2013), but in the case of RCTs
this drawback has more detrimental implications to the extent that
they are presented as the ‘‘gold standard’’.
298 B. Osimani
123
the claimed therapeutic benefit or to assess/discover unin-
tended effects. In particular, Vandenbroucke (2008)
endorses the idea that evidence hierarchies should be
reversed when the problem is not to test an intended effect
but rather to discover an unintended one (Table 1).
Vandenbroouke presents several arguments in support of
such a proposal. One is strictly methodological, the others
touch epistemological questions related to scientific infer-
ence and evidence evaluation.
The first point, which he admits not to be new in the
pharmacoepidemiological literature (Jick 1977; Jick and
Vessey 1978; Miettinen 1983), but which deserves further
attention among both scientists and practitioners, is meth-
odological, and concerns the idea that selection bias is less
likely to affect observational studies with respect to
adverse reactions.3 This is because unintended effects, qua
unintended, are not known in advance, and thus also not
known by the drug prescriber, who cannot take them into
consideration and thus bias treatment allocation. There is a
continuum of course, where hepatic reactions are predict-
able side effects especially for specific subgroups such as
elderly patients, whereas immune reactions are mostly
unpredictable and difficult to foresee. Because of this,
observational studies concerning adverse reactions will not
suffer from confounders in the same way as observational
studies for intended effects do (Vandenbroucke and Psaty
2008; Vandenbroucke 2004, 2006, 2007, 2008; Psaty and
Vandenbroucke 2008). Even if the doctor knows whom
s/he is prescribing the treatment to, treatment allocation is
masked with respect to unintended effects, given that s/he
does not know them: ‘‘As a mirror image for adverse
effects research, the doctor knows that he is prescribing a
drug to a particular patient, but he might not know the risk
that this patient has of developing a particular adverse
effect. […] This achieves the same aim of breaking the link
between prescribing and prognosis’’ (Vandenbroucke
2004: 1728). Ignorance of the unintended effects guaran-
tees the same unbiasedness of ignorance about whom the
treatment is actually administered. Thus ‘‘for many prob-
lems in genetics, infectious disease outbreaks, or for
adverse effects of drugs, no further evidence may be nee-
ded’’ (Vandenbroucke 2008: 6, my emphasis). The focus of
this argumentative point is randomization as a method to
avoid selection bias and the thesis is that, provided that this
bias can be excluded in the case of unintended effects,
randomization is not necessary in this respect.
The second point advanced by Vandenbrouke in defence
of his hierarchy reversal draws on epistemological con-
siderations and is based on his distinction between the
context of discovery and the context of evaluation in harm
detection and assessment. (Vandenbroucke 2008: 1–7).
According to Vandenbroucke, discovery is focused on
explanation and hypothesis generation; evaluation instead,
on hypothesis testing or confirmation, and thus it may be
hold that research methods differ in the opportunities they
offer with respect to either of these goals:
‘‘For discoveries, the original case reports, lab
observations, data analysis, or juxtaposition in liter-
ature may be so convincing that they stand by
themselves, either because of the magnitude of the
effect or because the new explanation suddenly and
convincingly makes the new finding fall into place
with previous unexplained data or previous ideas’’.
(Vandenbroucke 2008: 6).
To the extent that side effects are being discovered rather
than tested, ‘‘lower level’’ evidence may be totally
satisfactorily. Indeed, case reports remain the most sensi-
tive (and sometimes the only available tool) for discovering
side effects, and, far from constituting a second-best
choice, case series (and single case reports) as well as
findings in data and literature are a privileged tool for risk
detection (see also Stricker and Psaty 2004 and Glasziou
et al. 2007).
Vandenbroucke’s third point follows from the second in
that he formalizes the contrast between the context of
evaluation and the context of discovery in terms of dif-
ferent priors assigned to hypotheses of benefits and of
adverse reactions. When an intended effect is tested, prior
odds are quite high (there is a 1:1 odds that the therapy will
be at least as efficacious as the standard treatment). This
also reflects the requirement of equipoise for undertaking
such trials, i.e. that the standard therapy and the treatment
being tested have the same expected net utility (see
Freedman 1987, but also Gifford 1995, 2007a, b for
important specifications on this topic). Instead, Van-
debroucke points out, when new ideas emerge from
unexplained data or from the examination of existing
Table 1 Evidence hierarchy reversal for benefit versus risk assess-
ment (Vandenbroucke 2008: 5)
Hierarchy of study designs for
intended effects of therapy




(1) Anecdotal: case report and






(3) Retrospective follow-up studies
(4) Case–control studies (4) Prospective follow-up studies
(5) Anecdotal: case report and
series
(5) Randomised controlled trials
3 This topic relates also to Teira’s (2011) impartiality argument (see
Sect. 2 and 6 in this paper).
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literature, priors are quite low and they are often discon-
firmed by subsequent studies. Vandenbroucke deduces two
consequences from this state of affairs. The first one is that
it is the higher priors which make the results more robust,
not the method (Vandenbroucke 2008: 16–17). The second
one is that the reason why we accept uncertain results for
risks rather than for benefits is that evaluation and dis-
covery studies are associated with different loss functions:
evaluation is related to the approval of health technologies
and is required to assure stakeholders about their efficacy
and safety, whereas discovery is more related to the context
of research for its own sake, which might explain why
certain study designs are preferred to others in these
contexts.
I will come back to these considerations in Sect. 6; for
the time being, my main interest is to emphasize how
Vandenbroucke’s defence of his hierarchy reversal is
grounded on different epistemic rationales, namely on
criteria borrowed from the hypothetico-deductive method-
ology underlying statistical hypothesis testing, or on
inductive and abductive reasoning.
Hypothetico-deductive methods such as classical
hypothesis testing work with truth conditions and put severe
constraints on the kind of evidence which can be admitted,
or at all considered meaningful in assessing causal associ-
ations. Instead inductive and abductive methods work with
fallible indicators and put different sorts of evidence toge-
ther in order to infer the implications which derive from
their joint support to the hypotheses under investigation.
Roughly speaking, the former methods aim at hypothesis
rejection or acceptance with no degree in-between, while the
latter aim at a judgment on the plausibility of the hypothesis
given the data, which can be possibly quantified in proba-
bilistic terms. Thus the reasons for accepting ‘‘lower level
evidence’’ differ in the two settings.
In Vandenbroucke’s argumentation, a deductive approach
is evident in the justification he provides for considering
RCTs and observational studies on the same level: his point
is that they have the same reliability when the causal effect
is unknown, because this state of affairs amounts to avoiding
selection bias (I will explain why this sort of argumentation
is grounded on a deductive perspective in the next section);
an inductive approach pops up when he draws on loss
functions and priors in order to account for the intuition that
anecdotal evidence may make an excellent service to the
purpose of risk detection and assessment. In fact, another
rationale for accepting ‘‘lower level’’ evidence as a valid
support for hypotheses of harm lurks in Vandenbroucke’s
contribution. This is represented by the quotation cited
above, where he says that original case reports, observa-
tional data or juxtaposition in literature might be sufficient
because ‘‘the new explanation suddenly and convincingly
makes the new finding fall into place with previous
unexplained data or previous ideas’’ (Vandenbroucke 2008:
6). This sort of strategy can be considered to follow an
‘‘abductive’’ approach to scientific inference, in that it works
by putting together different sorts of evidence and infer the
implications which derive from their joint support to the
hypothesis under investigation.
4 Deduction, Induction and Abduction
in Pharmaceutical Harm Assessment
Vandenbroucke is not the only one to propose exemptions to
the standard canon of evidence hierarchies. Other examples
include even authors who are traditionally associated with
the orthodox paradigm of evidence based medicine. I will
present these proposals by tracing them back to the episte-
mological paradigms just mentioned. In analogy with the
analysis of Vandenbroucke’s argumentative points, I dis-
tinguish three main epistemological paradigms: (hypotheti-
co-) deductive (or, also said, falsificationist), inductive, and
abductive methods of scientific inference. For our purposes
however, the main distinction is between deductive and non-
deductive approaches—‘‘clinchers’’ and ‘‘vouchers’’ in
Cartwright’s terms (Cartwright 2007)—thus, I will draw the
line between these two categories.
4.1 Clinchers
4.1.1 Hypothetico-Deductive Approach: Hypothesis
Testing
The aim of hypothesis testing is to provide a means to
reject hypotheses on the basis of statistical evidence. The
logical ground for this procedure is provided by the
inference rule of modus tollens: H entails E, your evidence




In the case of hypothesis testing E is represented by the
difference among treated and non treated groups. If you
observe no significant difference, than you reject the causal
hypothesis. The rationale underpinning this sort of method is
that the difference between the comparison groups in the
trial is due to the contribution of the investigated factor, and
only to it. Consequently, the more likely a method is to be
able to exclude confounders (i.e. additional contributing
factors to the observed result), the more reliable is the
inference we base on it, and the higher the method is ranked
in the hierarchy. Indeed the main raison d’être of the very
idea of ranking evidence is to provide an a priori evaluation
criterion, based on the exclusion of confounders. As a
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corollary, case reports and observational data are considered
sufficient evidence for causal claims to the extent that
possible confounders can be confidently excluded.
Glasziou et al. (2007) for instance consider cases where
the relation between treatment and effect is so dramatic
that bias and confounding can be safely excluded even in
the absence of randomization: these are represented as
phenomena of sudden and drastic change in the clinical/
epidemiological pattern and are formalized in terms of
signal to noise ratio. Howick et al. (2009) relax the
requirement of dramatic effect and reduce it to the desid-
eratum that the effect size be greater than the combined
effect of plausible confounders. Along the same lines it is
however specified that observational studies must demon-
strate larger effects than randomized trials because of their
greater risk of confounding from selection bias (since the
allocation to treatment groups is neither randomized nor
concealed) and performance bias (since the participants
and caregivers are not blinded) (p. 188). Even though he
comes to an opposite conclusion, also Vandenbroucke’s
point concerning the equal trustworthiness of RCTs and
observational studies for unintended and unexpected con-
sequences of interventions is based on similar consider-
ations. As a matter of fact, he ascribes RCTs and
observational studies the same reliability on grounds that
ignorance about the unexpected consequences of an inter-
ventions achieves the same lack of bias obtained through
blinding (i.e. ignorance about whom will receive the
treatment).
4.2 Vouchers
4.2.1 Inductive (-Bayesian) Approach
The discovery/evaluation distinction proposed by Van-
denbroucke (2008) is cast in Bayesian terms, in that it
explores the epistemic asymmetry between benefit and risk
assessment in terms of different priors associated with
intended versus unintended outcomes. As a matter of fact,
the distinctive point between the inductive-bayesian
framework and classical hypothesis testing, is that in the
latter, hypotheses are formulated and then tested for
rejection/acceptance. Instead, in the former hypotheses are
assigned a probability, on the basis of available knowledge/
data, and this is then updated in light of new evidence.
Also, evidence is interpreted in light of all possible alter-
native hypotheses. Probability measures specify the degree
of support enjoyed by hypotheses.
The general principle of induction is that it cannot
deliver you a sure-fire guarantee about the conclusion of
your inference. However, it may help you assess the
plausibility of a given hypothesis on the basis of incon-
clusive but relevant evidence. For historical reasons,
Bayesian approaches to trial design and postmarketing
surveillance have not received much attention by the reg-
ulator and by the medical community. However the new
guidelines for pharmacovigilance (EMA and HMA 2012),
put a special emphasis on joint efforts for what can be
considered an information based (rather than power-based)
approach to pharmaceutical risk assessment, and encourage
the integration of information coming from different
sources (spontaneous case reports, literature, data-mining,
pharmacoepidemiological studies, post-marketing trials,
drug utilization studies, non-clinical studies, late-breaking
information; see also Herxheimer 2012).
4.2.2 Abductive Approach
This strategy rather rests on an approach to scientific
inference which instead of experimentally isolating the
causal factor under investigation, works by putting together
different pieces of evidential facts and then inferring the
implication of their joint occurrence. Rather than filtering
evidence by ranking it, this approach aims to accommodate
all data in a unifying picture. It is more or less knowingly
advocated by different authors in relation to the detection
and causal assessment of harms. Aronson and Hauben
(2006) for instance put forward that ‘‘In some cases other
types of evidence may be more useful than a randomised
controlled trial. And combining randomised trials with
observational studies and case series can sometimes yield
information that is not available from randomised trials
alone’’ (my emphasis). This idea is also at the basis of the
recent proposal by Howick et al. (2009), Russo and Wil-
liamson 2011, and Stegenga (2011) to integrate evidence
hierarchies with Bradford-Hill criteria for causal inference.
As a matter of fact, Bradford-Hill criteria are not meant as
truth conditions for causality but rather as imperfect indi-
cators which jointly support the hypothesis of causation.
Hence, Howick’s and Stegenga’s proposals move away
from the idea of obtaining perfect information about cau-
sality in a one-shot test and go in the direction of abduc-
tive/inductive reasoning.
It is worth recalling at this point that Bradford Hill
criteria are meant as an alternative approach to hypothesis
testing for causal assessment. At page 299 of his most cited
paper, Sir Bradford Hill specifies the rationale behind his
nine guidelines:
‘‘None of my nine viewpoints can bring indisputable
evidence for or against the cause-and-effect hypoth-
esis and non can be required as a sine qua non. What
they can do, with greater or less strength, is to help us
make up our minds in the fundamental question—is
there any other way of explaining the set of facts
before us, is there any other equally, or more, likely
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than cause and effect?’’ (my emphasis. Thus, Brad-
ford Hill both refers to explanatory power and like-
lihood as reliable grounds to justify causal judgments,
thereby adopting, at least implicitly, an alternative
approach to causality as that implied by RCTs. And
immediately after that he adds: ‘‘No formal tests of
significance can answer those questions. Such tests
can, and should, remind us of the effects that the play
of chance can create, and they will instruct us on the
likely magnitude of those effects. Beyond that, they
contribute nothing to the proof of our hypothesis’’,
which is not the only point in his paper where
Bradford Hills presents is criteria as opposed to tests
of significance.
Table 2 illustrates the epistemological rationales for
justifying ‘‘lower level’’ evidence according to hypotheti-
co-deductive, abductive and inductive approaches to sci-
entific inference.
Whereas the acceptability of lower level evidence for
harm assessment is increasingly acknowledged by scholars
of different epistemic stances, the reasons provided for the
exemption from standard evidence rankings are different.
In classical hypothesis-testing, The result is expressed as
the probability (p value) that the experiment delivers the
observed result—or more ‘‘extreme’’ results—if the treat-
ment makes no difference (so called null Hypothesis: H0).
For the result to be at all meaningful, it is essential that the
observed difference among groups is due to the treatment
and only to it. Which in turn explains the insistence on the
exclusion of confounders. Abductive methods instead,
work with imperfect indicators, which need to be con-
nected by means of an explanatory hypothesis: thus not
only can any relevant observation be used for justifying the
hypothesis under consideration, but it also must be so (the
greater the proportion in a data-set which a hypothesis
accounts for, the greater its explanatory power). Inductive
approaches differ from classical hypothesis testing, in that
hypotheses are neither refuted nor accepted, but instead are
associated with a probability which is updated in light of
data, following Bayes theorem (on its turn grounded on the
calculus of probability). Also in this case, any piece of
possibly relevant evidence can provide a certain amount of
support to the entertained hypothesis. The main constraint
is provided by the requirement of coherence.
The essential distinction between clinchers and vouchers
is that whereas the former put strict desiderata on evidence
for it to allow meaningful inferences, the latter are guided
by the idea that all relevant evidence—or as much data as
possible in the case of abduction—should be taken into
account in order for the inferential procedure to be valid.
This is also called the principle of total evidence.
5 Total Versus Best Evidence
Keynes (1921) traces back the origin of the principle of
total evidence to Bernoulli’s maxim that ‘‘in reckoning a
probability, we must take into account all the information
which we have’’ (Carnap 1947: 138, footnote 10; quoting
Keynes 1921: 313). The principle of total evidence has
been a topic of hot debate among philosophers such as
Hempel, Carnap, Ayer, Braithwaite, and Kneale among
others. An outline of the history of the debate is out of the
scope of this paper. For the present purpose it is sufficient
to point out its relation with the non-monotonic character
of inductive inferences.
Nonmonotonicity means that conclusions of inductive
inferences (either quantitative ones, such as in probabilistic
approaches, or qualitative, such as in adaptive logics) are
contingent and may be invalidated by additional informa-
tion (Kyburg and Teng 2001; Meheus 2011). As a matter of
fact, induction can be characterized as an inference where
the evidence does not entail the hypothesis, but only more
or less strongly supports/undermines it (Ayer 1956, 1957).
Inconclusive evidence is used to assess the plausibility of a
hypothesis and to possibly quantify it in a probabilistic
fashion, so that, for instance P(H|E) = .9; but there may
always be additional information F, which may lower this
support, so that, for instance, P (H|E&F) = .2. This means
that ‘‘acquired support’’ may get lost if additional infor-
mation undermines it. Let’s illustrate this phenomenon
Table 2 Epistemological paradigms and related rationales for justifying ‘‘lower level’’ evidence





if H0 = true (p-value)
Investigated factor is isolated by
balancing the experimental groups
as to all other prognostic factors
Only if alternative explanations for the observed
result (confounders) can be safely excluded, or
treatment effect swamps them by a statistically
significant amount
Abduction Connection of data in
light of explanatory
hypothesis
Account for as much evidence as
possible
Explanatory power of hypothesis in light of data
Inductive-Bayesian Bayes theorem Principle of total evidence—
coherence




with an example. A doctor thinks that a patient is celiac,
because all his/her available evidence E (adverse reactions
to certain foods, iron deficiency, a series of additional
symptomatic phenomena) points to this diagnosis, however
he then prescribes a series of serum tests and they all result
negative (evidence F). Then the strong support to the
diagnosis of celiac disease provided by E is ‘‘corroded’’ by
the negative evidence F and the doctor needs to look for a
hypothesis which accounts for both E and F: for instance a
simple food intolerance.
Table 3 provides a formal comparison of deductive and
inductive inference with reference to the problem of non-
monotonicity.
The example in the table shows the case where a given
hypothesis H is favoured over its complementary (:H)
after learning E, and then it is disfavoured after learning
also F (‘‘defeating evidence’’).
Statistical hypothesis-testing is a kind of approach
which admittedly follows a Popperian hypothetico-deduc-
tive method of scientific enquiry. And being this paradigm
inherently deductive, it does not feel urged to address the
issue of non-monotonicity. Once you have conclusive
evidence E rejecting hypothesis H, any other piece of
evidence becomes irrelevant. Thus the closer the evidence
gets to this deductive ideal, the better: best evidence means
evidence which maximises internal validity.
Indeed evidence hierarchies have been developed as a
decision tool to help clinicians pressed by time constraints,
to integrate their clinical expertise with evidence coming
from basic and clinical research (Evidence Based Medicine
Working Group 1992; Sackett et al. 1996; Straus and
McAlister 2000). However by putting their emphasis on
ranking and on internal validity they endorse a lexico-
graphic rule of implementation of evidence hierarchies. For
instance, if you have evidence E from a cohort study which
results in a significant difference between exposed and
non-exposed group, and you obtain evidence F from an
RCT which fails to reject the null hypothesis that the dif-
ference between treated and non-treated groups is non-
significant, then the non-difference hypothesis holds (F
discards E). This is because F is supposed to represent the
difference produced by the treatment alone (which equals 0
in this case), whereas E does not have this guarantee and
may result from other prognostic factors. While evidence
hierarchies have also been given a heuristic interpretation
(see: Howick et al. 2011), this does not change the fact that
the rules are epistemically grounded on internal validity
maximization.
A somewhat unwanted consequence of this ‘‘take the
best’’ approach is that it has become commonplace to
assume an uncommitted attitude towards observed associ-
ations least they are ‘‘proved’’ by gold standard evidence
(see the case study below as an example for this attitude).
Even if more sophisticated versions have been devel-
oped which are at pains to distinguish between different
hierarchies depending on different evaluation goals—see
for instance the CEBM4 levels of evidence subdivided in
therapy, prognosis, diagnosis, and economic analysis—
still, efficacy and harm assessment are coalesced in one and
the same column: therapy-prevention-etiology-harm,
where meta-analyses of RCTs, followed by single RCTs,
are at the top of the ranking. Similarly, Guyatt and col-
leagues (2011) admit the difficulties inherent in the eval-
uation of evidence for harm, but propose a framework (the
GRADE System) where its quality is assessed with the
same criteria proposed for efficacy evaluation. Particularly,
evidence for harm coming, say, from observational studies
is given lower weight than evidence for efficacy coming,
say, from RCTs, thus biasing the overall risk–benefit
assessment in favor of the drug.
More generally, the very idea of ranking or up- and
downgrading evidence on the basis of its internal validity is
at the opposite side of a unifying approach which aims to
account for all the evidence at disposal. In fact, non-
deductive approaches must take into account all available
evidence, because no matter how much a piece of evidence
supports a given hypothesis, the possibility of defeating
evidence can never be excluded.
4 Howick et al. 2011; http://www.cebm.net/mod_product/design/
files/CEBM-Levels-of-Evidence-Introduction-2.1.pdf.










No other additional evidence
can change the conclusion. If,
in addition to E, you come to
know F, you always have H as
a conclusion:
E! H
E; F;. . .
H
:
When E represents non-conclusive
evidence for H, there may always
be the possibility that
P HjEð Þ[ P Hð Þ;
and that additional evidence F
might reverse this inequality thus
leading to the following result:
P HjEð Þ\P HjE;Fð Þ





No additional evidence would
change this conclusion
The bearing of this phenomenon is
most evident when comparing
the strength of support provided
by the evidence to the hypothesis
H and its complement (:H). So
that you may have:
P HjEð Þ[ P :HjEð Þ
And, after learning F:
P HjE; Fð Þ\P :HjE;Fð Þ:
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A straightforward consequence is that reversing hierar-
chies may not represent the real solution to the problem of
imperfect risk information. Rather, one should consider the
specific epistemic structure of the problem at hand and then
consider whether clinching or vouching methods should be
preferred.
6 Should We Reverse Evidence Hierarchies?
Considering the above analysis of evidence evaluation and
epistemic criteria underlying deductive versus inductive/
abductive approaches to scientific inference, it becomes
clear that the issue is not whether hierarchies should be
reversed or not, but rather what kind of approach best
serves the purpose of causal assessment with respect to
harms. I can find at least four reasons why clinchers should
be preferred to vouchers when assessing harm.
6.1 Integration of Prior Knowledge and Observation
Frequentist statistics does not allow to incorporate priors in
hypothesis evaluation. This is a particularly detrimental
drawback in the case of harm assessment considering that
much knowledge of the drug behavior may be inferred
analogically from same-class molecules or similar entities.
Also, theoretical awareness about the drug unknowns
should be taken into account when evaluating risk signals.
For instance, most compounds are racemates, meaning that
they have an equal amounts of left- and right-handed
enantiomers of a chiral molecule, and generally only the
effects of one of the two enantiomers are sufficiently
known through the approval procedure, while the effects of
the other are ignored. Culpable negligence of this state of
affairs is at the origin of the Thalidomide tragedy for
instance. Finally, historical knowledge about drugs harm-
fulness in general cannot be neglected in the process of
causal assessment. In fact, the acceptability of anecdotal
evidence or of uncontrolled studies for assessing risk has to
do with a high prior about the general capacity of the drug
to bring about side-effects: Whereas there is total igno-
rance as to any specific side effect which might be possibly
caused by the drug, still there is almost certainty about the
fact that the drug will indeed cause side-effects beyond the
ones already detected in the pre-marketing phase. This high
prior derives from historical knowledge and past experi-
ence with pharmaceutical products: it may be more or less
precise depending on the novelty of the molecular entity
and more or less high depending on the risk profile of better
known analogous drugs or drug classes. Anyway, when
combined with the high prior belief that there are unknown
risks yet to be detected, ‘‘lower level evidence’’ may
constitute a sufficient basis for action in proportion to the
magnitude of the detected risk and the plausibility of the
causal association.
Indeed the high default prior for an undefined risk also
explains the rationale behind the introduction of the pre-
cautionary principle in the pharmaceutical domain and is
also strongly reflected in the regulation which introduced
the notion of ‘‘development risk’’ (or ‘‘potential risk’’), i.e.
the unknown latent risk unavoidably associated with the
drug, as well as the pharmacosurveillance system. The drug
is approved ‘‘with reservation’’ (approval can be withdrawn
at any moment on the ground of newly discovered adverse
reactions) and it is constantly monitored precisely because
of the high prior associated with the possibility of it
causing other side-effects beyond the ones discovered in
phase I-III of the approval procedure. Thus the accept-
ability of non-experimental evidence is not due to the fact
that stakes are lower, but on the contrary, just because these
are high, evidence choice is allowed to be highly flexible in
order to allow any data to play a role in early risk detection
and prevention.
6.2 Cumulative Causal Learning and Categorical
Versus Probabilistic Causal Assessment
From the time a risk is not known, to the moment in which
it is incontrovertibly proven to be causally associated with
the drug, there is a period of evidence accumulation which
constitutes a state of partial and imperfect (but continu-
ously increasing) knowledge. In this period it cannot be
claimed that there is a causal link between the drug and the
detected risk; but neither can we behave as if we knew
nothing about it. Still, the latter attitude is precisely the
only possible policy allowed by an epistemology grounded
on hypothesis rejection. Moreover, following the precau-
tionary principle, which has been developed precisely by
taking into account these considerations, you are not sup-
posed to wait for the causal connection between harm and
suspected drug to be certain, before you take adequate
countermeasures, but instead, you should act as soon as the
probability of causal connection is high enough to recom-
mend countermeasures because of a negative risk/benefit
balance. This probability might be also very low, in case
the risk magnitude is considerably big with respect to the
expected benefit. The frequentist mode of summarizing
statistical data, following which hypotheses may only be
accepted or rejected, cannot be of any use to this purpose.
6.3 Impartiality
The issue of impartiality assumes in the case of benefit
versus risk assessment opposite characteristics. Since
benefit is intended and desired, but may be counterfeited
for obvious commercial interests, the most natural way to
304 B. Osimani
123
deal with bogus products is to put the claim of efficacy to
the test of strict trials (which is indeed what originated the
success of randomized trials in the regulatory domain:
Teira 2011). As for the risk, the situation is quite opposite:
on the side of the industry, there is all interest in dis-
counting the drug as a possible causal contributor to the
side effects, thus the stricter are the standards for causal
assessment, the easier it is for them to provide whitewashed
drug profile.
Teira (2011) conceptualizes impartiality as a way to deal
with uncertainty such that it cannot be exploited by some
party’s private interest. Well, waiting for an RCT to
definitively prove that an observed risk is really associated
with a suspected drug exactly represents the case in which
the uncertainty about the causal association is exploited by
the industry’s private interest.5 I think this is what Papa-
nikolaou et al. (2006) have in mind when they say that ‘‘it
may be unfair to invoke bias and confounding to discredit
observational studies as a source of evidence on harms’’.
By regimenting benefit and risk assessment with the same
standards, we forget that in the case of risk, the question we
want to answer is not whether the drug really causes it, but
whether we can safely exclude that it does.
Yet, the established commonplace that causation can
only be proved by higher level evidence, ends up with
dismissing causal hypotheses unless supported by such
evidence, and with disregarding the evidential force of
other epistemic cues such as the likelihood of the total
available evidence on the hypothesis of causation, or its
explanatory power.6 I will present the recent discussion on
the debated causal association between acetaminophen and
asthma as a case in point.
7 The Case of Acetaminophen and Asthma
The asthma epidemic, which started in 1960 is still an
enigma for epidemiologists and immunologists alike. It is
out of the scope of this paper to exhaustively present the
puzzles raised by the change in prevalence and severity of
this disease across Western countries (to which an enor-
mous list of publications is devoted and for which there are
specially devoted journals). I am rather interested in the
current debate concerning the suspicions about acetami-
nophen (also known as ‘‘paracetamol’’) being a possible
contributor to the inception and exacerbation of this dis-
ease, especially in paediatrics. In fact, a significant asso-
ciation between acetaminophen and increase in asthma
incidence/severity has been established in observational
studies (Henderson and Shaheen 2013; Holgate 2011;
Farquhar et al. 2010). The question now is whether, given
the available evidence, we should wait for an RCT to prove
that this association is causal, or whether we should already
recommend against its use among at risk people, especially
children and pregnant women. McBride (2011) and Mar-
tinez-Gimeno and Garcı́a-Marcos (2013) favours this latter
position, whereas most commentators align with the EBM
protocol and urge for RCT trials in order to settle down the
issue. I will briefly present the case and then relate it to the
preceding philosophical discussion.
7.1 How Suspicion Fell on Acetaminophen
Statistical data quantifying the change in asthma preva-
lence and severity that there has been in the United States
and in other Western countries have struck the attention of
health practitioners and epidemiologists since the early
nineties: it is reported a 75 % increase among adults in the
U.S. in the last 3 decades and a 160 % increase among
children in the same period (Burr et al. 1989; Eneli et al.
2005; Ninan and Russell 1992; Mannino et al. 1998, 2002;
Seaton et al. 1994; Eder et al. 2006; Subbarao et al. 2009).
Provided that host susceptibility is unlikely to change so
abruptly, epidemiologic research has focused on environ-
mental factors (and more recently, on gene-environment
interactions) that might be supposed to have changed as
well, in the same or a compatible time-period: (1) increased
exposure to outdoor and indoor pollutants; (2) decreased
exposure to bacteria and childhood illnesses during infancy
(the ‘‘hygiene hypothesis’’); (3) increased obesity incidence
and prevalence; (4) changes in diet and oxidant intake as
well as physical activity (Platts-Mills et al. 2005); (5)
cytokine imbalance as a reaction to environmental aller-
gens in early childhood leading to lifelong T-helper type 2
(allergic) dominance over T-helper type 1 (nonallergic)
reactions, thus increasing the risk for atopic disease (see
Eneli et al. 2005; Seaton et al. 1994; Shaheen et al. 2000).
However these have provided contrasting signals ranging
from protecting to inducing asthma, sometimes depending
on the exposure age (Martinez-Gimeno and Garcı́a-Marcos
2013).
For instance, on the basis of a careful examination of all
available evidence, Seaton et al. (1994) dismissed causes 1
5 This is all the more true when risk data are already available from
observational studies, which themselves need a sufficiently long time
before they can deliver significant results (prospective designs) or can
be started only when the drug has been used for a sufficiently
extended period (retrospective designs).
6 A noteworthy contribution in this respect is constituted by Russo
and Williamson’s effort to provide an epistemic approach to causality,
which considers both evidence of statistical association and evidence
of underlying mechanisms as jointly contributory and reciprocally
complementary to providing evidence for causality (Russo and
Williamson 2011). See also a further development of this line of
thought in: Clarke et al. (2012 and forthcoming). Joffe (2011)
provides a careful review of major biological mechanisms relevant for
causal inference in epidemiological investigation.
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and 5 as major candidates for inducing asthma epidemic
because of a mismatch between the patterns of asthma
increase and the increase of any of the incriminated indoor
or outdoor pollutants/allergens in the environment.
Because of this mismatch, it is implausible that they are
responsible ‘‘alone or in combination, for the substantial
rise in the prevalence of atopic disease’’ (172). Seaton et al.
(1994) thus point their attention to a reduction of host
resistance due to the ‘‘westernized’’ diet: reduced con-
sumption of asthma-protective food such as fresh vegeta-
bles, fruits, which are important sources of antioxidants
(e.g. vitamin C and b-carotene), as well as red meat and
fresh fish, sources of ubiquinone, selenium and zinc, which
are essential cofactors for antioxidant defence mechanisms.
Indeed, whatever its diverse and complex etiology, asthma
is characterized by airway inflammation, one important
mechanism of which is the generation of oxygen free
radicals. Thus, lack of nutritional antioxidants can be rea-
sonably considered a relevant cause for asthma exacerba-
tion. However the diet hypothesis is a very complex one to
prove because diet is difficult to measure; particularly it is
difficult to identify the combined and independent effects
of the different nutrients (Eder et al. 2006). Also, the same
element may have contrasting effects on the same outcome,
such as for instance selenium which is an antioxidant but
may also upregulate immune responses typical of allergic
asthma. The hygiene hypothesis has been questioned also
because of scarce consistency between the time trends of
other allergic diseases (such as hay fever) and asthma
(Platts-Mills et al. 2005). More generally, it is by now
established that none of the environmental factors alone is
able to explain the time-trend, and more attention should be
devoted to their interactive effects on the incidence and
severity of asthma (Eder et al. 2006).
Unlike the association between asthma and various
environmental factors, its association with acetaminophen
consumption seems to be clearer and consistently positive
across studies. More interestingly, the time of acetamino-
phen introduction in clinical practice and its consumption
trends seem to perfectly reflect asthma epidemic and
therefore to provide a distinctive explanation for it.
The first clue indicating a possible relationship between
acetaminophen and asthma has been indirectly provided by
a study conducted in 1998 by Varner et al. (1998) in which
they detected a precise correspondence between increase of
asthma incidence and increased acetaminophen use as a
substitute for aspirin (substitution which occurred once an
association was recognized between aspirin and Reye’s
syndrome). The trend levelled off in the 1990s, i.e. at a
time when acetaminophen had already become one of the
most widespread analgesics. Varner et al’s tentative
explanation of this phenomenon was that asthma increase
was due to aspirin avoidance, as aspirin may protect from
asthma through inhibition of prostaglandins. However, this
hypothesis was soon discounted on grounds that, if this had
been the case, then one should have observed a decrease of
asthma incidence when aspirin was first introduced
(Shaheen et al. 2000). Thus the suspicion finally fell upon
acetaminophen itself (Newson et al. 2000) and subsequent
investigations explicitly aimed to examine the hypothesis
of causal connection between acetaminophen and asthma.
A series of observational and quasi-experimental studies
have investigated the hypothesis that acetaminophen is
causally associated with an increase of asthma incidence/
severity (Newson et al. 2000; Lesko et al. 2002; Barr et al.
2004; McKeever et al. 2005; Karimi et al. 2006; Beasley
et al. 2008; 2011b; Shaheen et al. 2008; Amberbir et al.
2011 see tables in appendix).
One among the most telling studies in this respect is a
prospective survey realized over a sample of 73,000 female
nurses (Barr et al. 2004), who were asked in 1990 and 1992
about their medication habits (acetaminophen included)
and known diagnoses. In 1996, 346 among those of them
who had not any record of asthma at the beginning of the
study, were diagnosed with asthma. Women who took
acetaminophen [14 days/month were 1.63 times as likely
to be diagnosed with asthma as those who did not assume
acetaminophen (95 % CI 1.11–2.39). The prospective
design refuted the hypothesis of reverse causation, i.e. that
asthma might induce a higher level of acetaminophen
consumption, due to its clinical implications, such as
higher than average frequency of fever and headache.
Furthermore, the increase was dose-dependent and aspirin
as well as nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs showed
little relationship to asthma.
The closest study to a RCT was a double blind ran-
domized clinical study performed within the Boston Uni-
versity Fever Study. Among the children enrolled for the
study (84,192, \12 y) a subgroup of subjects diagnosed
with asthma (n = 1879) was evenly assigned to three
distinct treatments consisting of low-dose ibuprofen, high-
dose ibuprofen or acetaminophen (12 mg/kg per dose). A
significant dose-dependent association was once again
found between acetaminophen exposure and asthma exac-
erbation: those treated with acetaminophen for respiratory
infection subsequently had a higher need of outpatient
asthma visit (2.3 times higher; 95 % CI 1.26–4.16; Lesko
et al. 2002). No dose-dependence for ibuprofen was found
instead. Although short-term effects in already asthmatic
subjects cannot be straightforwardly extrapolated to effects
on asthma inception (Henderson and Shaheen 2013), these
results provide significant supporting evidence for the
existence of some mechanisms linking acetaminophen and
asthma.
In fact, possible biological pathways mediating the
causative action of acetaminophen for asthma had been
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identified well before a suspicion of causal connection
between acetaminophen and asthma emerged in the epi-
demiological literature. Eneli et al. (2005) summarize these
findings and present five possible (non-exclusive) causal
pathways accounting for the role of acetaminophen in
asthma exacerbation. Three pathways depend on the
influence of acetaminophen on glutathione depletion.
Glutathione molecules mitigate oxidative stress. Thus, by
depleting glutathione, acetaminophen contributes to hy-
perresponsiveness to environmental antigens, thus promot-
ing atopic disease; furthermore, it has been hypothesized
that accumulation of the end product of acetaminophen
metabolization (N-acetyl-p-benzoquinonemine) is conju-
gated by glutathione into a harmless substance: thus with
insufficient presence of glutathione, N-acetyl-p-benzoqui-
nonemine (NAPQI) accumulates in the liver and arylates
cellular macromolecules, producing cell death; in this case,
acetaminophen has a toxic effect by negatively impacting on
the cellular ‘‘scavenger’’ which should clean up its toxic
metabolite. Another possible glutathione dependent pathway
of asthma exacerbation regards the switching, caused by
reduced glutathione levels, from a T-helper-1 to a T-helper-2
(allergic) response to antigens.
One of the two pathways unrelated to glutathione
involves the lack of suppression of cyclooxygenase, which
is also an inflammatory pathway. Cyclooxygenase pro-
motes the production of Prostaglandin E2, which tilts the
immunologic process towards a T2 response: thus, by
inhibiting the suppression of cyclooxigenase, acetamino-
phen induces an allergic response and thereby increases the
chance of asthma exacerbation or insurgence.
The fifth possible pathway is an immunologic response
to acetaminophen itself: this possibility has been investi-
gated through skin-prick tests which measured the level of
acetaminophen-specific serum IgE after oral challenge of
diverse quantities of acetaminophen (Galindo et al. 1998;
de Paramo et al. 2000) and resulted to be positive. Fur-
thermore, other studies have detected elevated levels of
histamine in subjects treated with acetaminophen (hista-
mine mediates the cascade of inflammation triggered by
IgE). However, knowledge of the pathogenesis of other
analgesia-induced asthma undermines the plausibility of
this hypothesis, because this sort of effects is thought to be
produced through the cyclooxigenase rather than through
the IgE-mediated pathway.
More recently an additional immunologic pathway has
been hypothesised, namely the production of neurogenic
airway inflammation caused by the transient receptor
potential ankyrin-1 (TRPA1): this is stimulated by detect-
able concentrations of NAPQI in the lung produced by
acetaminophen (Nassini et al. 2010). Also, another possible
acetaminophen-asthma mediating mechanism is linked to
its antipyretic effect which possibly reduces the cytokine
storm of febrile responses, thus reducing the level of
Interferon-c and Interleukin-2 and thereby predisposing the
organism to an allergic (Th2) rather than to a non allergic
response (Th1). However, whereas the antipyretic action of
acetaminophen is well-established, its influence on cyto-
kine production still needs to be proved and may depend on
the cause of the fever (Farquhar et al. 2010). Finally, it has
been shown that acetaminophen weakens the immune
response to rhinovirus infection and prolongs it in volun-
teers (Graham et al. 1990).
Possible pathways are illustrated in Fig. 1.
While all pathways are only indirectly relevant to
asthma pathogenesis, their plausibility is strongly sup-
ported by experimental data at different levels (in vitro,
in vivo, and clinical studies). For some, this evidence
provides some mechanistic rationale, and strengthens the
support to the causal hypothesis provided by the evidence
obtained at the population level, at the point that no addi-
tional randomized studies are needed in order to consider
acetaminophen as a causative factor for asthma exacerba-
tion or insurgence. Others instead hold a conservative view
and are concerned by confounding. Indeed the detection
process reflects the hierarchy reversal proposed by Van-
denbroucke (2008): observational studies (and all the more,
case reports and basic science) come earlier,7 then com-
parative studies further investigate the causal relationship,
finally prospective studies are meant to provide the guar-
antee that the causal association goes in the supposed
direction. However justification of the causal hypothesis is
far from reaching a consensus on this basis. In fact, the
accruing evidence in favour of the acetaminophen-asthma
connection, is generating two opposing stances in the sci-
entific community.
7.2 The Acetaminophen Enigma in Asthma
The evidence gathered so far in support of the hypothesis
of causal association between acetaminophen and asthma
has generated two opposite stances. On one side, a series of
authors show some reluctance in accepting such evidence
as a sufficient basis for practice change and for establishing
a causal relationship between acetaminophen and asthma,
on grounds that it does not result from randomized clinical
trials (Eneli et al. 2005; Allmers et al. 2009; Johnson and
Ownby 2011; Karimi et al. 2006; Wickens et al. 2011;
Chang et al. 2011). Particularly, these authors express the
concern that the acetaminophen-asthma relationship may
be explained by reverse causation, confounding by
7 A case study suggested the association of acetaminophen and
asthma as early as in 1967 (Chafee and Settipane 1967), but this has
not triggered further analysis until the asthma epidemic of the 70’s
90’s.
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indication or preference for acetaminophen rather than
ibuprofen in children at risk for asthma. Other authors,
although less sceptical about the causal relationship, nev-
ertheless equally require or recommend the performance of
adequately powered placebo-controlled trials to establish
causation (Holgate 2011; Henderson and Shaheen 2013).
On the other side, Martinez-Gimeno and Garcı́a-Marcos
2013, emphasize that ‘‘apart from tobacco smoke exposure,
no other genetic or environmental factors, including genes,
allergens, infections and bacterial substances, has shown the
stubborn and consistent association with wheezing disorders
prevalence as acetaminophen has done’’ (Martinez-Gimeno
and Garcı́a-Marcos 2013:120) and they recommend against
a too liberal use of acetaminophen in children, while waiting
for regulatory agencies to do their part and reconsider the
safety profile of acetaminophen (Martinez-Gimeno and
Garcı́a-Marcos 2013:121). Furthermore they are against the
performance of double blind RCTs with placebo, since
‘‘contrary to common claims, a placebo arm would be
impractical and unethical, because it would subject partici-
pants to a substandard and unacceptable treatment during a
very long time’’ (p. 114). Thus they recommend special
kinds of RCTs, where the intervention is avoidance of
acetaminophen (letting subjects being administered other
analgesics) and control is free consumption of any analge-
sics, acetaminophen included.
According to other authors Beasley et al. (2011a),
‘‘When the study findings are considered together with
other available data, there is substantive evidence that
acetaminophen use in childhood may be an important risk
factor for the development and/or maintenance of asthma,
and that its widespread increasing use over the last
30 years may have contributed to the rising prevalence of
asthma in different countries worldwide’’ (p. 1570, my
emphasis). An even stronger commitment to the hypothesis
of causal association is expressed by McBride (2011), who,
considering all the evidence available, as well as his per-
sonal experience as a paediatrician pulmonologist, claims
that evidence of causal association between acetaminophen
and asthma can by now be regarded as strong enough to
warrant a change in prescription practice. McBride justifies
his claim by appealing to the consistency of interdisciplinary
Fig. 1 Possible relevant pathways conducing from acetaminophen to asthma. Solid arrows represent established links (through in vivo or in vitro
studies). Dashed arrows represent relevant associations
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evidence: (1) strength of the association displayed in com-
parative studies; (2) robustness of association across geog-
raphy, culture and age; (3) dose–response relationship
between acetaminophen exposure and asthma; (4) coinci-
dence of time trends in acetaminophen use and asthma
increase; (5) lack of other equally strong causal explana-
tions; (6) relationship between asthma epidemic and per-
capita sales of acetaminophen across countries; (7) plausible
mechanism. Particularly, because of the overlapping time
trends of the asthma epidemic and of acetaminophen con-
sumption, a causal link between the two seems to explain the
asthma epidemic more than other environmental factors can
do. McBride explicitly warns against the use of acetami-
nophen in children with asthma or at risk for asthma and
claims that if further evidence is required, then this is for
documenting product safety rather than the contrary,
because its harmful potential is sufficiently demonstrated by
the evidence collected so far. By shifting the burden of
proof, McBride assumes that, given the available evidence,
the hypothesis of causal connection between acetaminophen
and asthma is stronger than that of its absence; or, at least,
that given the expected harm and benefit, the probability of
causal connection between acetaminophen and asthma is
high enough as to shift the balance against its use.
However, whereas detractors of the causal association
need nothing more than appealing to the received view that
observational data cannot prove causation, supporters of
the causal link between acetaminophen and asthma feel
unease about the lack of RCTs confirming their views and
mix up categories informing evidence hierarchies with
other criteria of causal judgment such as Bradford Hill
criteria or convergent evidence of different kinds, which
are unrelated, and possibly in outright contrast with the
very idea of ranking evidence. For instance, Martinez-Gi-
meno, Garcı́a-Marcos’ analysis (2013), explicitly draws on
typical EBM categories, but then unwittingly blends them
with reasoning about biological mechanisms, and with
Bradford Hill criteria for causal assessment. Beasley et al.
(2008) and McBride (2011) base their argumentation on
convergent evidence of different kinds, but the latter feels
compelled to call for a reversal of the burden of proof in
order to substantiate his claim.
The dissent concerning the best course of action among
scholars is ultimately caused by differing epistemological
views which are left implicit. Those recommending the
performance of placebo-controlled RCTs are in line with
the rationales underlying evidence hierarchies. Thus they
insist on the elimination of any suspicion of confounding,
especially confounding by indication (Henderson and
Shaheen 2013; Chang et al. 2011) before any causal claim
can be established on firm grounds. On the other side,
supporters of the causal link, especially McBride (2011)
and Beasley et al. (2011a, b), point to the joint support of
different and independent sources of evidence as a valid
basis for dropping any need for RCTs. Who’s right?
We might try to answer to this question by drawing on
the three dimensions in the enterprise of causal assessment
for harms mentioned in Sect. 6: (1) integration of prior
knowledge and available evidence; (2) cumulative causal
learning and probabilistic assessment of causality; (3)
impartiality.
1. In the acetaminophen case, prior knowledge about the
molecule itself would be rather against the hypothesis
of harmfulness, in that it has been generally considered
an harmless analgesics, and this might also explain the
reluctance to accept this causal hypothesis (Martinez-
Gimeno and Garcı́a-Marcos 2013). However many
prima facie harmless substances have been retired
from the market after discovering surprising noxious
effects. Furthermore, in the case of acetaminophen a
relevant amount of biological data point to its potential
inflammatory effects on the airways through multiple
(possibly additive) pathways. Dismissal of the causal
link because of possible confounding factors at the
epidemiological level explicitly eludes this evidence.
This is also valid for other supporting evidence such as
the dose–response relationship found in many studies,
and in general for the higher likelihood of the entire set
of data on the hypothesis of causation rather than on its
denial;
2. Whereas detractors of the causal hypothesis seem to
feel uncommitted until contrary proven and advocate
for the performance of RCTs before taking any action,
its supporters feel challenged by the evidence already
available and consider what should be thought and
done on its basis. Contrary to what is expected, the
former attitude is not neutral since its default is that
that there is no causal association, until proved by
RCTs, whereas the available evidence does no longer
warrant the categorical rejection of this hypothesis;
3. Dismissal of the causal association between acetami-
nophen and asthma on grounds that the overwhelming
epidemiological evidence may be produced by con-
founders represents a case where uncertainty about
causal connection may be exploited by interested parties
(Lowe et al. 2010 and Holgate 2011 have conflicting
interests for instance). In the end, a too rigid attitude
towards evidence quality may run against the reasons
for which quality standards have been introduced.
8 Conclusion
Both philosophers as well as epidemiologists and health
scientists have acknowledged the role of so called ‘‘lower
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level’’ evidence as a valid source of information contrib-
utory to assessing the risk profile of medications on theo-
retical (Aronson and Hauben 2006; Howick et al. 2009;
Vandenbroucke 2006) or empirical grounds (Papanikolaou
et al. 2006; Benson and Hartz 2000; Golder et al. 2011;
Concato et al. 2000). However, they have difficulty in
assigning a precise epistemic status to this kind of evidence
and in providing a coherent justification for the sorts of
exemptions they propose. In general, evidence quality
coming from other sources than RCTs is considered high to
the extent that possible known or unknown confounders
can be safely excluded (Glasziou et al. 2007; Howick 2011;
Howick et al. 2009). Vandenbroucke (2008) adds to this
scheme the distinction between the context of evaluation
and the context of discovery as a possible explanation for
the asymmetry between evidence standards for benefit
versus risk assessment. On this basis he also proposes to
reverse evidence hierarchies when risks rather than benefits
of medical treatment are under scrutiny. (Psaty and Van-
denbroucke 2008). This is only part of the issue however.
My analysis has focused on the distinction between
‘‘clinchers’’ and ‘‘vouchers’’ (Cartwright 2007) intended as
two opposite stances towards scientific inference and evi-
dence evaluation. Methods such as hypothesis testing are
clinchers in that they are based on deductive rules of
inference; instead inductive and abductive methods of
hypothesis assessment are vouchers in that they cannot
guarantee the conclusion which they favour. Whereas
clinchers work with truth conditions and put severe con-
straints on the kind of evidence which can be admitted, or
at all considered meaningful in assessing causal associa-
tions; inductive and abductive methods put different sorts
of evidence together and infer the implications which
derive from their joint support to the hypotheses under
investigation. Roughly speaking, the former methods aim
to hypothesis rejection or acceptance with no degree in-
between, while the latter aim to a judgment on the plau-
sibleness of the hypothesis given the data, which can be
possibly quantified in probabilistic terms.
Evidence hierarchies are based on clinchers and ranking
aims to internal validity maximisation thus promoting a
‘‘take the best’’ approach. Instead vouchers work with the
principle of total evidence. Thus the reasons for accepting
‘‘lower level evidence’’ differ in the two settings. But
current practices have difficulty in assigning a precise
epistemic status to this kind of evidence because they more
or less implicitly stick to the rationales underpinning evi-
dence hierarchies, has illustrated by the acetaminophen
case.
The tension between detractors and supporters of the
necessity to perform placebo-controlled RCTs before
establishing a causal link between acetaminophen and
asthma originates exactly from the antagonism between
two school of thoughts, clinchers enthusiasts versus
vouchers adherents, which is left implicit. I unearthed the
different epistemic paradigms underlying these different
methodological stances in order to (1) allow a transparent
discussion of the reasons why ‘‘lower level evidence’’ may/
should be accepted in each specific context; (2) provide a
theoretical underpinning to the increasing consensus that
evidence for harms should be evaluated with different
standards than those used for testing benefit claims.
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